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Abstract: starting from the critic against two theoretical-political points of the Jürgen Habermas’ theory of modernity, 
i.e. his understanding of the Western modernization as systemic institutional self-differentiation, self-referentiality 
and self-subsistence, and his conception of a juridical-political procedural paradigm based on such notion of 
modernization, I argue that the systemic theory concerning modernization leads to strong institutionalism and to 
depoliticization of the institutional structuration, legitimation and evolution. The basic characteristic of systemic 
theory, which is the institutional self-referentiality and self-subsistence regarding political praxis and social normativity, 
autonomizes social systems of justifying and organizing themselves according to an inclusive democratic political 
praxis and to a biding notion of social normativity, depoliticizing them. From here emerges a radical separation 
between systemic institutional dynamic and democratic political-normative praxis, between institutions and civil 
society, in that systemic institutions become independent and closed in relation to politics and social normativity, 
allowing only a representative political role to social movements and citizen initiatives, centralizing and monopolizing 
the institutional legitimation and the social evolution inside the very own institutions. A radical democratic political 
praxis which can face such strong institutionalism based on the systemic theory must politicize both the liberal’s 
notion of Western modernization and its consequent strong institutionalism, refusing the systemic theory as 
epistemological-political basis to the foundation of the contemporary institutional constitution and legitimation. It 
signifies also the normative-political centrality of the civil society’s arena, practices and social subjects as the platform 
to institutional grounding and evolution.
Key-Words: Systemic Theory; Strong Institutionalism; Political Representation; Democracy; Radicalness.
Teoria sistêmica, institucionalismo forte e política representativa: outro caminho para uma política 
democrática radical
Resumo: partindo da crítica a dois pontos teórico-políticos centrais na teoria da modernidade de Jürgen Habermas, 
a saber, sua noção de modernidade ocidental como autodiferenciação, autorreferencialidade e autossubsistência 
sistêmicas, e a sua concepção de um paradigma jurídico-político procedimental baseado em tal compreensão de 
modernidade, argumento que a teoria sistêmica relativa ao processo de modernização leva ao institucionalismo 
forte e à despolitização da estruturação, da legitimação e da evolução institucionais. A característica básica da 
teoria sistêmica, que consiste na autorreferencialidade e na autossubsistência institucionais frente à práxis política 
e à normatividade social, dispensa os sistemas sociais de justificarem-se e de organizarem-se com base em uma 
práxis política democrática inclusiva e em uma noção vinculante de normatividade social, despolitizando-os. Daqui 
emerge a radical separação entre a dinâmica institucional sistêmica e a práxis político-normativa democrática, entre 
instituições e sociedade civil, no sentido de que as instituições tornam-se independentes e fechadas em relação à 
política e à normatividade social, permitindo somente um papel político representativo aos movimentos sociais e 
às iniciativas cidadãs, e centralizando e monopolizando a legitimação institucional e a evolução social dentro das 
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próprias instituições. Uma práxis política democrática radical, que enfrenta tal institucionalismo forte baseado na teoria 
sistêmica, deve politizar tanto a modernização ocidental de cunho liberal quanto seu consequente institucionalismo 
forte, recusando a teoria sistêmica enquanto a base epistemológico-política para a fundamentação da constituição e 
da legitimação institucionais contemporâneas. Isso também significa a centralidade político-normativa da arena, das 
práticas e dos sujeitos sociais da sociedade civil como a plataforma para a fundamentação e a evolução institucionais.
Palavras-Chave: Teoria Sistêmica; Institucionalismo; Representação Política; Democracia; Radicalidade.
INTRODUCTION
The starting point of that paper is the intrinsic linking among strong institutionalism, political parties 
and economic oligarchies based on the affirmation of a systemic understanding of the institutional 
structuration, legitimation and evolution. Systemic theory concerning institutions is the major tendency 
in contemporary political theory and even in terms of Realpolitik, and it signifies that institutions or social 
systems are a set of technical norms and practices streamlined by a self-referential and self-subsisting 
internal procedure, assumed by self-authorized technicians and political elites. Now, which is very 
important in the current political praxis is the centrality of institutional technical, formal, impartial and 
neutral analysis and action as the real core – both normative and political – of the democratic society 
and its evolution along the time. The paper’s basic argument is that strong institutionalism is founded 
on a notion of institution as a neutral and impartial super-subject which monopolizes the guard and 
fomentation of the social normativity, as well as it centralizes the legitimation and the performing of 
social evolution as an institutional matter and way. Here appears the institutional closure concerning 
social movements and citizen initiatives, and therefore the strong institutionalism: institutions are a 
normative-political structure which is impartial and neutral regarding civil society’s political subjects, 
what means that just the institutions and their proceduralism represent the effective arena and norms 
of a democratic constitution, so just by institutions and according to their internal procedures and 
legal actors the social evolution is legitimized and performed. Here, civil society’s political subjects 
have only a secondary and representative role.
The aim of the paper is to reconstruct philosophically and even sociologically such linking between 
systemic theory and strong institutionalism. I argue that the connection between systemic theory and 
strong institutionalism leads directly or indirectly to the consolidation of a problematic triple consequence: 
(a) a notion of institutional autonomy concerning the social subjects, in that institutions are a set of 
impartial, neutral and very objective norms and procedures which allow fair representation and equal 
opportunities of participation for all social subjects, as if institutions were independent of these social 
subjects, their hegemony and struggles; (b) an affirmation of the institutional monopolization of the 
social normativity, in the sense that institutions (as impartial, neutral and very objective structures, 
norms and procedures) guard and foment it to all society, and not contrary; (c) an institutional 
closure regarding to a direct democracy and the centrality of political representation as the key of 
the democratic dynamic, based both on the institutional centralization of political arena, procedures 
and actors, and on the institutions’ systemic self-referentiality in relation to civil society, its political 
subjects and social struggles.
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My first central argument against systemic theory is that political institutions and capitalist market 
have (in these systemic theories) the same logic (i.e. a self-referential and self-subsisting organization 
and dynamic), and here appear both the sense of institutions’ closure and self-referential dynamic, 
and the political representation as the basic democratic praxis. Now, here emerges also the intrinsic 
linking among strong institutionalism, political parties and economic oligarchies that characterizes 
current democratic Realpolitik (and Brazilian democratic Realpolitik in particular): systemic institutions 
only can be accessed and performed by political-economic elites and their technicians, the same way 
that institutional logic (both of political institutions and of market) is autonomous and self-subsisting 
concerning the social normativity and civil society’s political subjects, what means that such logic 
cannot be substituted or violated from outside by other actors or principles or logics (like social 
normativity). Systemic institutional logic can be performed only from inside and by authorized elites 
(political, economic and scientific elites, truly), not by common citizens and social movements. And at 
the last systemic institutional logic delimitates what politics can and cannot do in relation to market’s 
constitutions and evolution: the social systems’ self-referentiality and self-subsistence mean that each 
social system or institution is independent of other institutions, as a technical-logical, non-political 
and non-normative sphere. Because of this characteristic, institutions cannot be substituted or violated 
by other institutions. So democracy and social normativity have no place in the market, as they have 
only a weak place in the strong institutionalism.
My second central argument is that a radical democratic praxis that faces such linking among strong 
institutionalism, political parties and economic oligarchies must deny the systemic comprehension of the 
institutions or social systems in favor of a political and normative institutional constitution. Indeed, the 
starting point of a radical democratic political praxis is exactly the emphasis on the political structuration, 
legitimation and performance of political and economic institutions, what means the centrality both of the 
social struggles and civil society’s political subjects as the effective normative-political basis for the 
institutional constitution, and of a strict normative-political dependence of political and economic 
institutions concerning those social struggles and civil society’s political subjects (as social classes). 
In both cases, therefore, a radical democratic political praxis confronts systemic institutional closure, 
self-subsistence and self-referentiality in relation to social normativity and to an inclusive democratic 
political praxis, denying the institutional independence regarding politics and substituting a technical-
logical institutional grounding as basis of the systemic institutional constitution by an inclusive political 
praxis based on the political institutional structuration and on the intrinsic linking between political 
and economic fields. So, as consequence, representation founded on the systemic comprehension of 
institutions is overcome by an inclusive democratic praxis that frames institutions from a conception 
of social normativity which is very political, non-systemic, which is very normative, non-technical.
SYSTEMIC THEORY AND POLITICAL PRAXIS: THE JÜRGEN HABERMAS’ THEORY OF 
MODERNITY
Many contemporary political theories have a notion of modernization that is characterized by the 
systemic self-differentiation, self-referentiality and self-subsistence, in that modernity’s emergence and 
development signify the consolidation of different and autonomous institutions which monopolize 
specific fields of social evolution (see WEBER, 1984, 1992; PARSONS, 2010A, 2010B; HAYEK, 1987, 
1995; NOZICK, 1991; HABERMAS, 1990, 1999, 2012A, 2012B; GIDDENS, 1996, 2000, 2001). 
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Each one of these institutions has a very proper logic of functioning which is, as I said above, totally 
particular, self-referential and self-subsisting in relation to other social systems or institutions. Now, 
what is a social system or institution, according to contemporary political theories? What means the fact 
that a social system monopolizes a specific field of social evolution, becoming the very own field that it 
represents? A social system or institution is a set of rules, practices and procedures that ensembles and 
delimitates the legitimation and functioning of specific social fields as particular social fields, i.e. as social 
fields which have (each one) a proper identity that is not similar to other institutions or social systems. 
In other words, each social system has a very essential dynamic (legitimation, procedures, norms, actors) 
which at the same time identifies and differentiates it concerning the social world and other institutions. 
Such essential dynamic gives it specificity and constitutes a barrier which cannot be violated or crossed 
by other institutions, social dynamics and political subjects. So, in a systemic perspective, only from 
inside, a social system or institution can be understood, legitimized and performed. Any movement 
from outside is delegitimized by systemic institutions, because it destroys the institution’s very own 
and particular, self-referential and self-subsisting logic of programming and functioning.
That is, according to those philosophical-sociological theories, the very basic characteristic of the 
Western modernization. Different of traditional social worlds, which have a very profound imbrication 
among nature, society and individuality, Western modernization is directly defined by the strong 
separation among them. So, traditional societies, based on such intrinsic linking, have two important 
characteristics that differentiate them of modern societies: they have no social mobility and criticism, 
because society and its relations are naturalized ones, at the same time that the individuals are subsumed 
by that naturalization of society; and they have a strict dependence and connection among politics, 
economy and culture, in that all social dynamic and even all particular relations are linked into a 
normative totality and founded on it. That last traditional characteristic means the fact that traditional 
world is basically a normative world, i.e. all of its relations are based on an ethical justification which 
is non-technical, non-measurable scientifically. Therefore, the connection among politics, culture and 
economy signifies that it is not possible to separate and to individualize such areas in the traditional 
societies (as those areas have not an individual logic of functioning, because they are absolutely linked 
in the social totality), and the understanding of a particular field of a traditional society implies the 
comprehension of the relational totality from which that sphere is part of (cf.: HABERMAS, 1999, 
p. 51; 2012a, p. 140-141). Now, the emergence and development of the Western modernization assume 
a correlative double distinction regarding traditional societies.
We can see the Western modernization’s specificity in the Jürgen Habermas’ theory of modernity, 
which is my epistemological-political basis of analysis from now on. According to Habermas, European 
modernity (that is his model of philosophical-sociological analysis) arises as a double and imbricated process 
which differentiates it in relation to traditional societies, namely: the progressive consolidation of a 
secular and individualistic culture that leads to the radical separation between nature, society or culture 
and individuality (Cartesian distinction between res cogitans and res extensa expresses such modern 
specificity exemplarily); and because of that, the separation between politics (power), culture (social 
normativity) and economy (money). On the first case, European cultural modernity is characterized 
by secularism and individual rights, which become the epistemological, political and cultural basis to 
the foundation of a notion of social normativity or universalism (lifeworld, in Habermasian terms); 
on the second case, each field of social reproduction becomes independent, autonomous and self-
referential regarding other social fields (as we can see in modern liberal philosophies). So European 
doispontos:, Curitiba, São Carlos, volume 13, número 2, p. 123-142, outubro de 2016 
127
cultural modernity is marked at the same time by the institutional secularization and individualism, 
which submit all institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution to normative-political criteria – 
social normativity (based on secularism and individualism) is the condition to the political-economic 
modernization, i.e. to the development of modern State and capitalist market; on the other hand, 
modern State (bureaucratic power) and capitalist market (money) have very proper and closed logics 
of functioning which cannot be substituted by social normativity and political spontaneity – power 
and money, in the systemic theories, are not political or normative ones, but technical-logical instances 
and instruments (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 227, p. 383-384, p. 590-591).
From here Habermas constructs a distinction between a notion of cultural modernity and a notion 
of political-economic modernization: on the first case, we have, as I said above, the comprehension and 
the stylization of an European culture based on secularism and individualism, which eliminates the 
society’s naturalization and generates the social criticism – that is the origin of the Habermasian critical 
theory’s social normativity or epistemological-moral universalism (discourse ethics, communicative 
action, lifeworld); on the second case, political-economic modernization, founded on denaturalization 
of society favored by European cultural modernity, is characterized by the separation among culture, 
politics and economy, in the sense that society is not anymore a totality dependent exclusively of the 
social normativity and of the political praxis, as all of its fields (and particularly politics and economy) 
become self-referential and self-subsisting concerning their proper structuration and legitimation. 
Here emerges the specificity of the political-economic modernization: bureaucratic political power 
and money have very proper logics of functioning which cannot be equivalent and framed by cultural 
modernity’s social normativity. On the one hand, therefore, cultural modernity submits all institutions 
to normative claims (or at least it tries to do that); on the other hand, political power and money are 
closed fields of action that do not depend of social normativity and political justifications to their 
evolution along the time: it is enough to appeal to their essential dynamics, to their self-referentiality 
and self-subsistence – and such appeal denies immediately normative claims and political praxis inside 
those social fields (see HABERMAS, 1999, p. 40-41; 1990, p. 13-14; 1997, p. 122, p. 143-144, p. 163; 
2012a, p. 683; 2012b, p. 278, p. 330-331). It is sufficient to systemic institutions (as power and money, 
technocracy and laissez-faire or economicism) a technical-logical structuration and legitimation which is 
allowed exclusively from their internal technical-logical field, practices, procedures, codes and legal staff.
Now, the specificity of bureaucratic political power (modern State) and money (capitalist market) is 
at the same time to be and not to be part of the social world, and then to be and not be linked to cultural 
modernity’s social normativity. They are part of the social because of their dependence of political 
obedience and labor (besides their necessity for human and natural resources, of course!); they are 
not part of the social because of their specific technical-formal logics of constitution and functioning, 
which are different of the normative constitution of the social. Then, bureaucratic political power and 
money submit lifeworld under their systemic imperatives, at the same time that they close themselves 
to society’s normative claims, political praxis and cultural integrity. That is the modernity’s beauty 
and tragedy, according to Jürgen Habermas. Cultural modernity is very explosive and it puts down 
conservative traditionalism (and Habermas understands traditionalism as a conservative social-cultural 
world), but modern State and capitalist market, conceived from a systemic comprehension, are not 
directly linked to and dependent of the social normativity, nor determined by them. As consequence, 
State’s and market’s development have the specificity of to be based on a very proper technical logic of 
functioning and legitimation that ignores strongly normative social claims and an inclusive democratic 
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praxis, as well as such systemic logic consumes social forces and resources as condition to its subsistence 
while a private and closed logic and technic – here emerge modern pathologies caused by systemic 
institutions which submit and colonize the lifeworld’s normative constitution by means of the technical 
dynamics of exploitation and legitimation (see HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 355, p. 551).
Now, the natural way for the resolution of that problem is, of course, the normative and democratic 
control of State and market, in that the social normativity and an inclusive democratic political praxis 
deny State’s and Market’s systemic constitution characterized by self-referentiality and self-subsistence 
concerning cultural modernity, substituting such institutional systemic comprehension and organization 
by normative justification and inclusive political participation. But Habermas said “no”! It is not possible 
to substitute systemic institutional constitution and legitimation by a direct democracy based on a 
notion of social normativity. Institutions’ systemic constitution and legitimation must be respected. 
Why? Because of the institutional systemic constitution which does not admit a direct normative and 
political intervention – that is, Habermas continues, the Western modernization (systemic institutional 
self-differentiation, self-referentiality and self-subsistence) (see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 61, p. 190; 
2003b, p. 106). Indeed, Habermas’ distinction between cultural modernity and political-economic 
modernity implies on the contraposition between normativity (and here democratic political praxis) 
and systemic institutions, in that each one of them has a very specific way of constitution, organization 
and legitimation. As consequence, a very acute contradiction between, on a side, democracy and, on 
the other side, State and market rationality is consolidated inside society, determining the weakening 
both of a critical social theory and of an emancipatory political praxis. Such contradiction means that 
democracy, based on a notion of social normativity and on an inclusive democratic political praxis, has 
not capability to frame and to substitute from outside systemic institutional dynamics, mechanisms 
and legal actors. Truly, a realistic analysis of Habermas’ theory of modernity must conclude that 
democracy has no place inside systemic institutions, because of their technical and logical constitution 
and evolution, whose finality is the subsistence of the very own systemic organization along the time 
beyond social normativity and political praxis, i.e. beyond a democratic constitution and legitimation 
of State and capitalist market.
Therefore, we must distinguish in the Habermas’ theory of modernity a double dynamic concerning 
social constitution, legitimation and evolution: on the one hand, social normativity and spontaneous 
political praxis, i.e. informal spheres, practices and political subjects from civil society; on the other 
hand, systemic institutional dynamic and logic, i.e. formal spheres, practices and legal actors (see 
HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 592; 2003a, p. 22; 2003b, p. 99). And we must be clear that in the Habermasian 
theory, the modernity emerges and develops itself because of the social normativity – because of the 
cultural modernity. Systemic institutional differentiation is a consequence of that, not contrary (see 
HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 590-591, p. 685). Besides we must be aware also of the fact that modern 
pathologies are caused by systemic institutional colonization (by bureaucratic power and money) of 
the normative and spontaneous lifeworld’s constitution and legitimation (see HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 
330-331, p. 355). So if we are aware of these two starting points of Habermas’ theory of modernity, we 
certainly won’t understand why social normativity and democratic political praxis cannot substitute 
or intervene from outside in the systemic institutional constitution and legitimation (after all it is 
exactly the systemic colonization of the lifeworld the cause of modern pathologies, such as poverty, 
marginalization, exploitation, technocracy, political formalism etc.). It has no sense to situate systemic 
institutional dynamic inside the social normativity and democratic political praxis (which could mean 
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that systemic institutional dynamic is subordinated to and dependent of the social normativity), but at 
the same time affirm that the systemic constitution is self-referential and self-subsisting concerning the 
normative and political constitution of the lifeworld (therefore, the systemic institutional constitution 
and legitimation are basically an internal and institutionalized procedure, non-normative and non-
political).
A double problematic and correlative consequence arises of the Habermasian contraposition between 
social normativity and systemic institutional logic: the centrality of systemic institutional logic, dynamic 
and proceduralism concerning institutions’ structuration, legitimation and evolution; and the indirect 
political intervention regarding social systems (especially capitalist market) which means the weakening 
of the political praxis as the basis of the societal and institutional life and action, or even the end of 
the political praxis as a basis of the societal and institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution. 
Indeed, the very first and basic point of consideration regarding institutions’ structuration, legitimation 
and evolution is the fact that they have an exclusive, autonomous and self-referential dynamic and logic 
of programming and functioning. It means that institutions are an end-in-itself (at least in a strong way) 
and their dynamics and foundations are basically internal to the very own institutions. In first place, 
therefore, institutions’ dynamic and validation are a monopoly of the institutions themselves, as well 
as such institutions centralize internally procedures, norms and practices which serve to structure and 
legitimize internal and external institutional functioning and relations. So in second place, institutions, 
according to systemic theories, become self-subsisting in relation to external contexts, i.e. they have 
an internal dynamic that is capable to ground and develop itself along the time, independently of those 
external contexts. In a such case, systemic institutions represent a complete and self-sufficient technical 
world, whose norms, practices, procedures and actors can sustain and evolve themselves from inside to 
the very own institution which they represent. I said technical world as representing systemic institutions 
because of the fact that such kind of institutional understanding conceives institutions’ structuration, 
legitimation and evolution as a logical and technical procedure, made by technical-legal staff based on 
technical-legal norms and practices.
Let’s take an example. Capitalist market must be conceived, legitimized and managed from economic 
arguments, as if economics were an objective (non-political and non-normative) science and practice 
founded on technical and legal arguments, principles and practices. That is the basic condition to 
think on economy, according to systemic theories and their strong institutionalism. But that is the 
same condition and rule to think on political institutions’ structures, problems and practices: even 
political institutions – as political parties, legislatives and courts – must obey an internal dynamic, 
procedures and actors which centralize and streamline the political-juridical constitution, grounding 
and legitimation in the name of all society and of its social subjects. In either cases (modern State and 
capitalist market are the central themes of analysis in the Habermas’ theory of modernity), institutional 
dynamic, procedures, norms, practices and actors have centrality concerning institutional constitution, 
legitimation and evolution, in the sense that they are institutional procedures and actors who legitimize 
both the institutional constitution and the social evolution. As consequence, Habermas talks about an 
indirect political intervention in the market and a citizen without subject in politics as the basic principles to 
the understanding of the contemporary market (indirect political intervention) and of the institutional 
politics (citizen without subject) (see HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 24, p. 147-148).
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What these two concepts signify? They signify the fact that we must abandon a direct political praxis 
concerning market’s and State’s constitution, legitimation and evolution, taking seriously their systemic 
programming and functioning as the basic starting point of the theoretical-political considerations – a 
contemporary radical politics begins from here and its fundamental sense and dynamic is dependent 
of that systemic institutional assumption. Indeed, the consequence of the Habermasian systemic 
understanding of capitalist market and modern State is their closure in relation to a democratic political 
praxis based on a general conception of social normativity which can ensemble and then determine 
priority market constitution and political legitimation. Systemic theory and systemic institutional 
constitution, legitimation and evolution are opposed to a general conception of social normativity and to 
an inclusive democratic political praxis which substitute technical and logical arguments, procedures and 
legal staff by normative-political arguments, considerations, procedures and common people (as social 
movements and citizen initiatives). Systemic institutions are streamlined only by internal procedures 
and actors, and determined basically by their internal self-referential and self-subsisting logic – so, their 
legitimation is fundamentally internal and based on internal necessities, instruments and procedures, 
then social normativity and democratic political praxis have no place in these systemic institutions.
What remains to the democratic political praxis in systemic theories? To live in the shadows of 
institutions and their systemic dynamic of constitution and legitimation; to have a representative and 
merely ornamental role in a double sense: social normativity and an inclusive democratic political 
praxis are politically peripheral concerning systemic institutions, their technical-logical constitution, 
legitimation and evolution; social movements and citizen initiatives have a peripheral political role 
concerning self-authorized and legal institutional technicians and political-economic elites. Now, a 
double problematic consequence regarding systemic institutions and their relations with the civil 
society emerges from the double condition mentioned above: systemic institutions are basically a 
technical and legal set of norms, practices, procedures and specialized staff which have a depoliticized 
and non-normative constitution, legitimation and evolution, because of their self-referential and 
self-subsisting understanding; systemic institutions are strongly opposed to social normativity and to 
democratic political praxis, due to their technical-legal constitution, which cannot be substituted nor 
by normative claims and principles, nor by political action and political subjects. So what remains to a 
radical democratic political praxis based on a notion of social normativity is the representative politics, 
determined by the strong institutionalism, i.e. the centralization and the monopolization of institutional 
and social legitimation and evolution by the very own systemic institutions (capitalist market and 
bureaucratic modern State) and their elites. In other terms, systemic institutions are non-normative and 
depoliticized with respect to their constitution, legitimation and evolution, denying as consequence 
the normative-political consideration on that institutional structuration and legitimation – that is the 
reason why they are strongly opposed to social normativity and to democratic political praxis.
STRONG INSTITUTIONALISM, PROCEDURALISM AND POLITICAL PRAXIS
Jürgen Habermas political-juridical procedural paradigm is a symptom of his dual theory of modernity: 
nor liberal (little politicized), nor republican (super politicized), but institutionalist. In other terms, 
Habermasian political-juridical paradigm leads to a strong institutionalism because of the centrality of 
the political-juridical institutions concerning the legitimation of the political praxis and of the social 
evolution. Habermas understands the liberal political-juridical paradigm as based on negative liberties 
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and on the economic self-referentiality and self-subsistence regarding social normativity and political 
praxis. According to such liberal paradigm, each social system and particularly the economic field have 
a very specific dynamic which must be respected from alien interventions, principles and actors. So the 
very fundamental sense of the politics is to protect that institutional systemic self-referentiality and 
self-subsistence (laissez-faire accessed and determined only by individual meritocracy which leads to a 
minimal politics). What matters, in the liberal political theory, is the institutional field, its structuration, 
norms, practices and actors – and they are beyond a general notion of social normativity and of a 
radical democratic political praxis – in this sense, the market only can be accessed by laissez-faire and 
meritocracy (see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 305-306, p. 325-326, p. 335-337). On the other hand, republican 
political-juridical paradigm emphasizes a direct and inclusive democratic political praxis as the basic 
motto to the social transformation and to the institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution. 
A republican paradigm denies, therefore, the systemic differentiation and autonomy concerning the 
social normativity and democratic political praxis, as well as the liberal’s negative and minimal politics. 
Here, there is not a separation between systemic institutional organization and normative-political 
praxis, in the sense that institutions are not objective, neutral and impartial worlds, as well as they have 
basically a political structuration which is resulted from conflicting social classes, their struggles and 
political hegemony. So according to the republican paradigm, institutions have a secondary political 
role in relation to a radical democratic political praxis, becoming subordinated to it: what matters are 
the political subjects and the social struggles – the political in its effective praxis, the politics as social 
praxis (see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 331-332).
The liberal paradigm is wrong, according to Habermas, because of the fact that the problem to economic 
stability and evolution is not the political institutions and the social rights. Capitalist market represents 
also a great challenge to democratic political organization based on a notion of social justice. Social 
justice is not a mirage, as said Friedrich Hayek (father of neoliberalism), but a social necessity, founded 
on a notion of social normativity and performed politically. So liberal economicism regarding political 
institutions and social constitution is partial, because it does not take seriously the dangerous social 
and political effects of the economic inequalities, of the concentration of income and of the market’s 
instability (see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 326). We cannot abandon political intervention and reparation 
(even if it is an indirect political intervention) – political institutions stabilize market dynamic. Republican 
paradigm is wrong in the moment that it centralizes political praxis in the civil society’s political subjects, 
refusing the political-normative centrality of the institutions (see HABERMAS, 1998, p. 14-21; 2003b, 
p. 145-146). Why such republican political comprehension is incorrect or partial? Because of the fact 
that it minimizes the institutional importance regarding the orientation and structuration of the social 
dynamic, something that civil society’s political subjects cannot do and guarantee (see HABERMAS, 
2003a, p. 290; 2003b, p. 21). A direct and radical political democracy is no longer possible today (if it 
signifies the centrality of civil society’s political subjects and the peripheral political-normative role of 
the political-juridical institutions), for there are no more social super-subjects as social classes, so social 
normativity is guarded, fomented and streamlined preponderantly by political-juridical institutions. 
The same way, a radical political praxis into the social systems, which intends to substitute money and 
bureaucratic power for social normativity and politics, is not possible, because of the institutions’ 
systemic constitution, which makes them self-referential, self-subsisting and closed to political praxis 
and social normativity – their technical-logical legitimation and functioning must be strictly respected. 
The republicanism erases and forgets the technical-logical character of the institutions or social systems, 
and that cannot be done in the contemporary societies.
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Now, which is the political-juridical procedural paradigm’s specificity in relation to the liberal and 
republican paradigms? It is the fact that the procedural paradigm does not accept the liberal argument of 
a problem concerning political intervention on the market and the social rights as basis of a democratic 
politics. Laissez-faire and meritocracy are not sufficient to stabilize a democratic society, which means 
that politics is absolutely important to it. In the same way, the procedural paradigm does not accept 
the republican strong emphasis on the civil society’s political subjects and their radical democratic 
political praxis, as well as the republican minimization of the institutional political-normative role (in 
relation to a democratic political praxis rooted on civil society’s spontaneity) (see HABERMAS, 2003b, 
p. 138-139). Currently, it is not possible to minimize the political-normative role of the political-juridical 
institutions, because of the decadence of leftist theories based on a totalizing comprehension of the 
society, its spheres and political subjects. Marxist theorethical-political categories – such as social 
classes, class struggles, and even the idea of society as a self-consciousness totality whose center would 
be constituted by economic life – are not valid today for the understanding of the democratic social 
and institutional dynamic and praxis (see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 83, p. 111; 1997, p. 133-134). An 
emancipatory political theory must have another theoretical and normative basis, and that is the case 
of the Habermasian procedural juridical-political paradigm.
Habermasian political-juridical procedural paradigm is constituted by three interdependent ideas: 
society is not a totality, but divided in closed and particularized social systems; there are no more social 
super-subjects, but only individual political subjects; political-juridical institutions – conceived in a 
systemic way – guard and foment social normativity (see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 20; 2003b, p. 24, p. 72). 
Now, contemporary societies are complex societies, i.e. very differentiated both in terms of individualization 
of the social-political subjects and regarding the consolidation of different and particular social systems 
(see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 17-18). There is no more a very strong identity and equality (cultural, 
political, economic etc.) between individuals, which means an individualization of social-political 
actors; and the society is not anymore a cultural-political core founded on a common center which 
gives all orientations and rules to socialization and individualization at all. So the current societies’ 
very important characteristic is their cultural-political individualization (particular social-political 
actors with no identity one each other) and the consolidation of different and conflicting social systems or 
institutions which have a very proper logic of programming and functioning. As consequence, there are 
not social classes as super-subjects, but only individual social-political subjects. So an emancipatory 
utopia founded on the revolutionary vocation and role of specific social classes is delegitimized as a 
theoretical-political alternative, in the same way that those social classes do not represent anymore 
an objective notion of social normativity in the name of all society. On the other hand, contemporary 
political praxis must start from the fact that society is not anymore a homogeneous institutional 
totality, in the sense that there is not anymore a common institutional core from which all society is 
streamlined. So also here a political utopia cannot presuppose that the social transformation is possible 
by the reconstruction of society’s central core: a radical political praxis has no more sense if it is based 
on such notion of society as a totality with a central political or economic core (as marxism does).
Contemporary political theory and praxis must start from the fact that current societies are marked 
by the consolidation of different and autonomous systemic institutions, in that each field of social 
reproduction is particular, self-referential and self-subsisting in relation to other fields (for example: 
economy is different of State, and vice versa; both are different of the social normativity; all the three 
have particular logics of programming and functioning). In a such situation, a social transformation is 
doispontos:, Curitiba, São Carlos, volume 13, número 2, p. 123-142, outubro de 2016 
133
always particularized (society is not a totality, but divided in different and autonomous social systems); 
it has not anymore totalizing range and effects, as well as it cannot intend to change all social systems 
(social systems which works only by their exclusive internal logic and dynamic). In other terms, political 
praxis is not anymore the central – the only central – core of the society; and it is not anymore the 
fundamental instrument from which society (as self-conscious totality) transforms itself along the 
time (see HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 25). A society divided in self-subsisting and self-referential social 
systems has many centers of power, each one of them with particular and closed logics of programming 
and functioning. Political praxis and political institutions are still important, but not central, as their 
political-normative-bureaucratic dynamics also are important, but they cannot substitute systemic 
institutional logics and dynamics (which are always self-referential and self-subsisting).
So here appears a Habermasian procedural paradigm’s double starting point or presupposition, 
namely: society is not a totality, but divided in many different and closed social systems; and there 
are not anymore social classes as political super-subjects. Now, a double problematic consequence 
(which was generated also by Habermasian theory of modernity and its separation between system 
and lifeworld, each one with particular and irreconcilable logics and dynamics) emerges from such 
double starting point: the systemic institutional centrality concerning the constitution, legitimation 
and evolution of each social field represented by its specific and related systemic institution; and the 
centralization and monopolization of the social normativity by political institutions which generates a 
strong institutionalism as basis to institutional and social grounding and evolution. Indeed, also in the 
Habermasian political-juridical procedural paradigm, the systemic theory gives the theoretical basis 
to the understanding of contemporary complex societies, in the sense that our current societies are 
based on systemic autonomization and self-referentiality – and dependent of such systemic organization. 
So Habermas adopts the systemic institutional constitution as a natural fact and point of starting to the 
comprehension, constitution and legitimation of the modern societies. He does not problematize such 
systemic approach as a liberal presupposition concerning modernity’s understanding and legitimation. 
That is his non-critic assumption; it is simply his starting point, and Habermas does not criticize it in 
any moment – contrarily to his critic against Marxist politicization of the social systems. According to 
Habermas, social systems or institutions, the moment they centralize and monopolize the legitimation 
and evolution of specific social fields, have a technical constitution, not a direct political and normative 
structuration and legitimation.
Therefore, the first problematic consequence of the Habermasian procedural paradigm, based on 
systemic institutional autonomization, is the very depoliticization of systemic institutional logic and 
dynamic, which become closed, self-referential and self-subsisting regarding to social normativity 
and to democratic political praxis, acquiring a technical-logical constitution and legitimation (see 
FORBATH, 1998, p. 272-286; WHITE, 1995, p. 133-136). Such liberal notion of modernization can 
always affirm itself as a technical and logical organization, as a non-normative and non-political instance. 
In that case, it organizes and evolves itself as a particular logic and dynamic which is separated and 
made independent concerning normative claims and political praxis. Indeed, liberal comprehension 
of modernity (such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick) argues in favor of the 
market’s self-referentiality and self-subsistence in relation to social normativity and political praxis, 
in that its constitution, legitimation and evolution is dependent of political institutions and social 
normativity only in an indirect way, as well as market’s logic and dynamic generate and determine 
social evolution or social-cultural consequences only in an indirect way. There is not, according to 
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those liberal political theories, a direct linking between very different systems as market, State and civil 
society: each one functions in a specific way, and that is the starting point to the understanding and 
legitimation of the market’s constitution and grounding. That is the reason why Friedrich Hayek says that 
social justice is a mirage: it presupposes a normative-political constitution of the market, as it affirms a 
linking among social, political and economic fields, denying economy’s systemic self-referentiality and 
self-subsistence, which is non-normative and non-political, just technical (laissez-faire and meritocracy). 
Of course, Habermas is not a conservative liberal; he argues against the return to a conservative liberal 
theory (such as neoliberalism), as he argues on theoretical-political failures of the neoliberalism 
(see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 119). But his presupposition of the systemic institutional autonomization 
as the theoretical-political basis to the understanding and legitimation of the Western modernization 
leads directly or indirectly to the systemic institutional depoliticization and non-normative systemic 
structuration, i.e. to the systemic institutional closure regarding social normativity and democratic 
political praxis. As consequence, the systemic theory conceives the institutions as a very closed, non-
political, non-normative, technical and logical set of norms, practices, rules and actors, beyond civil 
society’s political-normative control and influence.
The second problematic consequence of the Habermasian procedural paradigm is what I call of 
strong institutionalism regarding the constitution and legitimation of the political institutions. With the 
concept of strong institutionalism I understand the centralization and the monopolization of the social 
normativity by political institutions based on a systemic comprehension of its logic, dynamic, procedures 
and actors. Indeed, the Habermasian refusal to conceive social classes as political super-subjects leads 
to the concomitant refusal to link social subjects and social normativity. Here emerges the meaning 
of two concepts used by Habermas to signify the contemporary political specificity of democratic 
foundations. The first is the concept of law as medium between system and lifeworld (see HABERMAS, 
2003a, p. 61-62, p. 82). It means that political-juridical institutions assume the role of normative 
political-juridical tribunal concerning normative social claims directed to the systemic institutions: 
those political-juridical institutions must decide if the normative social claims are justified and even in 
which sense they must be focused on the institutional systemic structuration. In other words, the very 
own political-juridical institutions (based on a systemic self-comprehension and limited by systemic 
structuration of the other institutions) decide about the legitimity of the social claims directed to the 
institutions themselves. The second is the consequent concept of citizenship without subject, which means 
that the institutions assume the guard, foment and fostering of the social normativity, substituting 
the current nonexistent social classes (see HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 24). In a such case, the Habermas’ 
refusal of social classes as political super-subjects implies directly in the individualization of the civil 
society’s political subjects, and that means the correlative Habermasian refusal of the fact that a specific 
social class represents the very own social normativity.
In contemporary societies, no social class has the capacity to represent all society and even to frame 
all social systems. Now, the social normativity, in the moment that it is not anymore centralized 
and streamlined by social classes, is assumed and centralized into political-juridical institutions – of 
course, individual social subjects can assume normative contents and submit normative claims to 
institutional validation, but the institutions are the center and the normative-political basis to judge 
and legitimate such social matters, vindications and actors. The political-juridical institutions link 
system and lifeworld, centralizing and monopolizing the last world on the social claims, but the systemic 
constitution and legitimation are strongly autonomous of the political and juridical interventions and 
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controls – their systemic constitution and legitimation, which is non-normative and non-political, deny 
a direct juridical-political intervention. Therefore, both the systemic institutional legitimation and the 
democratic centrality of the political-juridical institutions minimize the social movement’s political 
role, depoliticizing highly the institutional constitution, validation and evolution. Institutions (political 
and economic institutions) become the very center of their own legitimation and evolution along the 
time. Social movements and citizen initiatives assume also a political-normative role, but they do not 
substitute the normative centrality of the political-juridical institutions, nor can intervene directly in the 
systemic institutional constitution and legitimation – the social movements’ political role is peripheral 
in relation to the systemic institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution, so the political-juridical 
center is constituted by the juridical-political institutions’ internal dynamic, procedures and legal staff, 
as of the social systems as a self-referential instances at all (here the social movements’ political role is 
denied by the market’s technical-logical internal constitution and legitimation).
So the Habermasian political-juridical procedural paradigm has as central normative basis the fact 
that institutions represent the basic core of a democratic society, as they assume and establish from 
internally the procedures, norms, practices and authorized actors which perform institutional constitution 
and evolution along the time. Now, institutions – with their procedures, norms and actors – represent 
all society and civil society’s political subjects. Of course, political-juridical institutions are based on 
an intersection between formal and informal public spheres, formal and informal political subjects, 
and formal and informal political praxis. Such dialectics between formal and informal politics is the 
condition, as Habermas said, to the democratic legitimation and evolution, i.e. institutions are not 
sufficient to a complete democracy; they require the social participation (see HABERMAS, 2003b, 
p. 34, p. 104). However, those two characteristics mentioned above – modernization as systemic 
self-differentiation and autonomy; institutional centralization and monopolization of the social 
normativity – lead both to the impossibility of a radical politics directed to the economic field, and 
to the strong institutionalism regarding the political legitimation and performing. On the one hand, 
democratic politics cannot substitute systemic logic and dynamic concerning institutional constitution, 
legitimation and evolution; on the other hand, social movements and citizen initiatives (as informal 
political praxis) cannot substitute institutional procedures, arenas and legal actors, because of the fact 
that institutions constitute the fundamental core of democracy. So, how the civil society can face social 
systems’ overwhelming totalization in relation to normative social reproduction? It cannot substitute 
systemic logic and dynamic by normative foundations; it cannot substitute formal spheres by informal 
spheres; as it cannot substitute political parties by social movements and citizen initiatives.
Habermas tries to avoid such problem of a strong institutionalism through the affirmation that a 
mature democratic culture (an effective informal democratic praxis, with informal arenas and political 
subjects) is the normative-political condition both to the institutionalism and to a radical democratic 
political praxis, in that social movements and citizen initiatives could prevent institutional corruption, 
autonomy and bureaucratization; they could also formulate political proposals and make political 
pressure against institutionalism, when it is incorrect (see HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 33, p. 58, p. 90-92). 
But here emerges two problems: first, the informal political praxis does not assume an institutional 
role, as informal political subjects cannot substitute formal political subjects, and only the institutions 
– according to their internal procedures, norms and actors – decide on the legitimation of normative 
claims and social evolution; second, a mature democratic culture is forged by social struggles which 
confront the political structuration and evolution of the institutions, denying a systemic institutional 
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comprehension as the basis of a democratic society. In that last case, a mature democratic culture 
emerges only by substituting institutions’ systemic self-referentiality, self-subsistence and autonomy 
concerning normative foundations and democratic political praxis by a direct and inclusive democratic 
political praxis into social systems. So if a democratic culture is the normative-political condition to systemic 
institutions and even to avoid or to minimize the strong institutionalism, then such institutions have not 
a self-referential structuration and legitimation, nor a technical-logical programming and functioning, 
as they cannot substitute informal arenas and political subjects, centralizing and monopolizing both 
the social normativity and the political legitimation of the social evolution. It signifies the politicization 
of the institutional systemic structuration, legitimation and evolution, in the sense that institutions 
become a political-normative matter and, then, getting directly accessed by an inclusive democratic 
political praxis based on a notion of social normativity – here, a representative politics and a systemic 
institutional autonomy are not sufficient or valid to the constitution, legitimation and evolution of 
the democratic society.
ANOTHER WAY TO A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: SOME CONCLUSIONS
In that paper, Jürgen Habermas’ theory of modernity has furnished to us normative-political arguments 
to think contemporary democratic constitution and legitimation. Habermas has three important 
arguments concerning current democratic societies: such societies are based on institutions’ systemic 
self-differentiation, self-referentiality and autonomization regarding social normativity and democratic 
political praxis; politics is no longer the center of the society, because of the societal division in closed 
and particular social systems; and political-juridical institutions become the basic core of a democratic 
society, centralizing and monopolizing both the grounding and the foment of the social normativity, 
and the legitimation of the social evolution. These three arguments lead to the strong institutionalism 
regarding both to the systemic institutional comprehension and to the political praxis. Here, a direct 
radical political praxis from civil society’s political subjects is delegitimized by the fact that political 
institutions, as economic institutions, have procedural, impartial, neutral and formal dynamic, norms and 
actors which assume the guard, the legitimation and the performing of social normativity, substituting 
informal democratic politics, arenas and subjects by the centrality of the formal politics, arenas and 
actors. Besides, a radical and inclusive democratic political praxis is also delegitimized by the systemic 
institutional structuration and legitimation, whose constitution is non-political and non-normative.
Now, what remains for facing the modernization’s pathologies is the representative politics as the only 
way to a contemporary democracy – which is based on such process of modernization – evolve and 
legitimize itself over time. On the one hand, systemic institutional constitution cannot be substituted 
by democratic political praxis and social normativity – it depends of a formal and technical organization 
which is self-referential and self-subsisting in relation to politics and social normativity. On the other 
hand, politics and political institutions are not already the center of a contemporary society based on the 
social-economic modernization. Politics and political institutions represent a particular field and praxis, 
existing side by side with other social systems – what means many particular logics of programming 
and functioning living side by side with each other and competing between them for hegemony (see 
HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 25). Representative politics is all which remains as democratic political praxis 
exactly by the fact that systemic institutions are closed to politics and social normativity, as strong 
institutionalism in politics is closed to informal spheres, arenas and political actors. Habermas said 
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that contemporary social movements must renounce to the utopia of a society which is self-organized 
in its totality, so the political praxis cannot substitute or intervene in all systemic institutional logics 
and dynamics (see HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 105-106). It does not mean that democratic political 
praxis loses its importance as one form of social organization, but it is limited by systemic logics and 
dynamics. However, the starting points of the habermasian theory of modernity – systemic institutional 
autonomization and strong political institutionalism – lead to the systemic depoliticization and therefore 
to the severe weakening of the democratic political praxis, which become peripheral regarding both 
systemic autonomization and the institutions’ centralization of the political legitimation.
That is the reason why Jürgen Habermas’ theory of modernity and its consequent political-juridical 
procedural paradigm cannot interpret correctly nor solve effectively a contemporary very dangerous 
political problem, namely: the profound imbrication among political parties, economic oligarchies 
and strong institutionalism founded on a systemic comprehension of institutional constitution, 
legitimation and evolution. Such theory of modernity cannot face that problem because of the fact 
that it depoliticizes the systemic institutional constitution in the moment that it assumes systemic 
theory as basis to the understanding of the Western modernization and of the current democratic 
societies’ political-institutional conditions. In a such case, the correlation between formal spheres, 
procedures, arenas and actors with informal spheres, procedures, arenas and actors is not sufficient 
to frame systemic institutional autonomization and closure regarding to normative claims and to an 
inclusive democratic political praxis. Systemic institutional logic and dynamic can always appeal to 
their specificity and particularity concerning their own constitution and legitimation, becoming highly 
a depoliticized and non-normative field.
Besides, social normativity and democratic political praxis are centralized and monopolized from a 
kind of strong institutionalism, which means that informal spheres, procedures, arenas and actors have 
a secondary and peripheral role in relation to juridical-political institutions (and to juridical-political 
institutions conceived in a systemic way and sense). Indeed, what matters to the Habermasian 
political-juridical procedural paradigm is, in first place, the political-juridical institutions – their 
internal norms, practices, procedures and actors – as basis of a democratic constitution, legitimation 
and evolution along the time. A society based on the consolidated individualization of the political 
subjects cannot base its normative constitution and legitimation on a particular and specific social 
subject; it must base its political stability, as its normative-administrative legitimation, on the very own 
political-juridical institutions which establish an arena, procedures, norms, practices and authorized 
actors as normative-political keys to the social evolution’s legitimation. Now, as I said before, Habermas 
institutes two conditions of such kind of political-juridical institutionalism: first, as commented above, 
it is not the center of a contemporary society based on the process of Western modernization, so it 
must live side by side with other social systems, each one of them with a very self-referential and closed 
logic of programming and functioning; second, it is necessary a mature democratic culture as the 
institutions’ normative basis. In the first case, political institutions are limited by institutions’ systemic 
logic and dynamic; in the second case (and that is very interesting) a mature democratic culture is the 
condition sine qua non to the political-juridical procedural paradigm – without that mature democratic 
culture, institutionalism itself does not guarantee its capability to centralize and monopolize both the 
social normativity and the social evolution’s legitimation in an impartial, neutral and publicized way.
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Now, what such condition means? It means that contrarily to what Habermas believes, the political-
juridical institutions are not the central core of a democratic society, but the very own democratic 
culture, i.e. the formal arena, procedures, norms, practices and actors are not the key to the democratic 
stabilization and evolution, but the very own informal arenas, procedures, practices and social subjects. 
So a democratic culture grounds, generates and sustains democratic institutions, and not contrary. 
Again, what it means? It means that civil society’s political subjects centralize and streamline the social 
normativity over social evolution and political institutional constitution, defining hegemonic ways, 
practices, codes and institutional designs which become the institutions themselves. They institute 
also a hegemonic comprehension of the social systems’ political threatening. Both cases imply there is 
not a stylized process of modernization based on the systemic autonomization and self-differentiation, 
but it is the result of class hegemony or of political struggles from civil society’s political subjects – the 
hegemonic comprehension of the process of modernization is a matter of social-political hegemony, 
not the natural fact of the modernization itself, as if modernization has an essence or if it were a 
direct, pure and homogenous way. The same way, democratic politics, the moment it is the condition 
to institutionalism, puts down the Habermasian political-juridical proceduralism’s basic idea, i.e. the 
centralization and monopolization of the social normativity by political-juridical institutions, as it 
puts down both the closed institutional logic and dynamic, and the representative politics. Informal 
arenas, practices and social subjects become the very political praxis and subjects in relation to systemic 
institutional constitution and legitimation.
Such finding (the centrality of civil society’s arena, practices and political subjects) enables the 
politicization of the social systems’ constitution and legitimation, as the overthrow of the systemic 
closure and autonomization concerning to social normativity and to an inclusive democratic political 
praxis. In a double sense the systemic institutional constitution and the strong institutionalism are 
inserted in and dependent of the social normativity: social reproduction is a normative praxis and 
has basically normative foundations; and democratic politics is grounded on and streamlined by civil 
society’s political praxis, cultural constitution and social subjects. Therefore systemic institutional 
legitimation is always a political and normative matter, made only by an inclusive democratic political 
praxis. There are not a separation and a conflict between system and lifeworld, but rather social struggles 
between social classes which institute a hegemonic political, normative and economic comprehension 
socially biding. There is no such thing like a technical and logical systemic institution, but the strict 
political-normative institutional constitution and legitimation which is a result of the social-political 
hegemony. So the hegemonic theoretical-political institutional conception is always generated and 
defined by social struggles between social classes or social super-subjects. Besides, systemic institutional 
logic has basically general role and effects, and it means that it cannot be conceived as a particular 
logic and dynamic with short range consequences. Systemic institutional logic and dynamic have 
macro consequences, i.e. political and normative consequences regarding to political institutional 
legitimation and to social evolution. So systemic institutional logic and dynamic cannot be separated 
as a particular and independent field of the political praxis and of the social normativity, which means 
their depoliticization and non-normative structuration. Contrarily to that, systemic logic and dynamic 
are political and have normative constitution, legitimation and evolution, as political and normative 
effects (see PIKETTY, 2014; WOLFE, 2009, 1980; ARBLASTER, 1984).
Democratic political praxis emerges beyond systemic theory and strong institutionalism, because it is 
raised on the civil society’s political subjects and social struggles – it is defined by them, it is streamlined 
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by the hegemonic political forces and their counterpoints. Systemic theory and strong institutionalism 
deny such political constitution and dynamic, as they depoliticize the systemic institutional structuration, 
legitimation and evolution. That depoliticization implies in the systemic institutional autonomy and 
self-referentiality concerning an inclusive and direct democratic political praxis, as well as in the 
centralization and monopolization of the social normativity and of the political dynamic by the very 
own social systems and political institutions. Here, as I said above, only the representative politics based 
on political parties have legitimity to perform institutional mechanisms and social evolution. Besides, 
as capitalist market – and it is the more important political-normative concern and social-political 
structure even in contemporary times! – is defined by systemic structuration and legitimation, it is 
also depoliticized regarding democratic political praxis. In consequence, it is not a normative field and 
has not a political-normative dynamic. So, capitalist market becomes a matter of economic elites and 
their technicians (because of the fact that it is a technical and logical field) with very particular, closed, 
self-referential and self-subsisting logic, dynamic, procedures and actors.
Here emerges in a double sense the intrinsic linking among strong institutionalism, political parties 
and economic oligarchies. First, systemic institutions only admit their specific and self-referential 
logic, dynamic, procedures and legal actors, becoming closed to an inclusive democratic political praxis 
and to normative claims; second, formal politics (institutional politics and political parties) become 
very dependent of the economic dynamic, logic and elites, by the fact that politics – which intends to 
perform a macro social action – always must legitimize both the institutional proceduralism and the 
social evolution according to the market as a system that is central regarding the social constitution 
and the political institutional structuration (there is also the private funding of the political parties, of 
course, as another problem for contemporary democratic politics – it leads to the profound intersection 
between political parties and economic elites too). But how the capitalist market is central to political 
institutional structuration and to social evolution? It is central to politics in the sense that it cannot 
be violated in its closed and self-referential logic and dynamic, as it imposes its systemic organization 
and legitimation to political institutions. So, such political institutions must respect market autonomy, 
self-referentiality and self-subsistence (and even acquiring market dynamic and logic into political 
structuration and legitimation), as they must perform politically the market conditions of reproduction, 
i.e. the framing of the lifeworld or civil society (and even the natural environment!) according to 
market logic and dynamic. That is the double sense of the intrinsic and nefarious linking among strong 
institutionalism (based on systemic institutional logic and dynamic), political parties and economic 
elites: such linking both empowers systemic institutional autonomy, closure, self-referentiality and 
self-subsistence regarding to politics and to social normativity, and depoliticizes institutional constitution 
and legitimation, submitting the social reproduction to the systemic institutional logic and dynamic.
Now, how an alternative political praxis can face such linking? First, it can start by inverting the 
political centrality of the systemic political institutions concerning informal arenas, practices and 
social actors, i.e. an alternative and informal political praxis must affirms itself as the basis to the 
institutional structuration, legitimation and evolution, and not contrary. Second, that implies in the 
politicization of the strong institutionalism based on systemic logic and dynamic. It is necessary, here, 
that civil society can deny political institutional self-referentiality and closure in relation to social 
subjects and to normative claims, which means that political institutions must share powers, arenas, 
practices and process of legitimation with the social subjects. So, in that case informal arenas, practices 
and social subjects assume a political role which is characterized by the substitution of the very own 
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formal institutions and political actors. The strong institutionalism depoliticizes social evolution 
and economic constitution, so informal politics and social subjects must politicize again the social 
evolution and economic constitution, politicizing also the political-juridical institutions and refusing 
their impartiality and neutrality as basis of contemporary politics: contemporary politics is a social 
struggle, not an impartial and neutral institutional proceduralism based on systemic institutional logic 
and dynamic. Third, an alternative political praxis must deconstruct the traditional naturalization of 
the process of Western modernization, i.e. a radical democratic political praxis cannot be based on the 
notion of Western modernization as systemic autonomization, self-referentiality and self-subsistence 
regarding political institutions, social evolution and normative claims.
There is not such separation between systemic institutions and lifeworld, between a logical dynamic 
and a normative-political dynamic; and there is not a systemic institutional closure, autonomy, 
self-referentiality and self-subsistence regarding political praxis and social normativity. That hegemonic 
comprehension of the Western modernization is resulted from a liberal comprehension of it, not a 
natural or general or objective process of modernization at all – it is a political comprehension, not an 
essential or metaphysic comprehension, nor a technical-logical comprehension. Liberal’s comprehension 
of the Western modernization has as central argument the systemic differentiation and depoliticization 
(laissez-faire), and that is the basis of the hegemonic liberal comprehension of Western modernization 
which is assumed even by contemporary left (as I have argued on Habermas’ theory of modernity, but 
it can be perceived also in the Giddens’ work). Such deconstruction allows the politicization of the 
Western modernization and as consequence its framing by an inclusive democratic political praxis 
founded on a notion of social normativity. Here, the profound imbrication among economy, politics 
and social evolution leads to the politicization both of that linking and of the particular constitution 
(which is political and normative) of each social system. So the systemic institutional politicization 
avoids systemic institutional self-referentiality, neutrality and impartiality concerning democratic politics 
and social normativity, as it puts the civil society’s political dynamic, subjects and struggles as the basic 
motto to the political hegemony. Above all, the politicization both of the systemic institutional dynamic 
and of the strong institutionalism shows that society is a political-normative totality with imbricated 
institutions and social subjects, i.e. it shows that all is politics and political – that is the starting point 
to a contemporary emancipatory and inclusive democratic political praxis.
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